The substation communication protocol used in smart grid allows the transmission of messages without integrity protection for applications that require very low communication latency. This leaves the real-time measurements taken by phasor measurement units (PMUs) vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, and hence makes high voltage to medium voltage (HV/MV) substations vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In this paper, a lightweight and secure integrity protection algorithm has been proposed to maintain the integrity of PMU data, which fills the missing integrity protection in the IEC 61850-90-5 standard, when the MAC identifier is declared 0. The rigorous security analysis proves the security of the proposed integrity protection method against ciphertext-only attacks and known/chosen plaintext attacks. A comparison with existing integrity protection methods shows that our method is much faster, and is also the only integrity protection scheme that meets the strict timing requirement. Not only the proposed method can be used in power protection applications, but it also can be used in emerging anomaly detection scenarios, where a fast integrity check coupled with low latency communications is used for multiple rounds of message exchanges. This paper is an extension of work originally reported in
Introduction
This paper addresses the integrity problem of protection messages in generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) communications at medium-and high-voltage substations. In protection applications, time is a critical component and therefore a fast communication plays an integral role in maintaining operation reliability of power systems. Examples of time critical applications are load shed (Adamiak et al., 2014) and synchrophasor-assisted transfer trip (Kundu and Pradhan, 2014) , where a trip signal is sent from a substation to another that could be more than 100 miles away. Clearing a fault quickly is paramount for protecting electrical equipment from damage and a delay in relay-to-relay communications could be detrimental to the power grid. Given the sensitivity of the issue, communication networks impose requirements that are very stringent, for instance, IEC 61850 standard limits the transfer time for protection messages to 1 4 cycle or 4 ms (for 60 Hz lines) for the most critical messages. Over the past two decades, many power companies have already deployed hundreds or thousands of PMUs and phasor data concentrators (PDCs) that have no cryptographic acceleration (Pappu et al., 2013) . These devices cannot maintain the strict 4 ms latency requirement when they are equipped with conventional hash based techniques, such as a cipher-based MAC (CMAC) (Dworkin, 2007) and a hash-based MAC (HMAC) (Khan et al., 2007) , because of the latency implied by the overheads.
Traditionally, as explained in IEC 61850-90-5 (IEC 61850-90-5, 2012) , when the latency implied by the MAC implementation cannot be tolerated, messages are transmitted in the absence of integrity protection, as shown in Table 2 . This leaves the data vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, which can alter the current phasor of the bus, for instance, to a value greater than the maximum rated current of the line or even to zero amperes. This would trigger protective relays to switch on and off, which could be costly to electrical equipment and perturb the grid, potentially leading to blackouts.
To meet the 4 ms latency requirement, we looked for a lightweight and a non-hash-based solution. A potential solution is in the use of a fast checksum, which has the advantage of having less computational cost. Checksums are common methods for detecting accidental data corruption, for instance, in TCP (Zander et al., 2007) and ZLIB (Sofia et al., 2015) ; and compared to MACs, they impose much less computational overheads. However, since checksums can be easily spoofed, we propose a novel integrity protection method, which hides checksum bits inside payload data using a fast bit permutation technique. The proposed integrity protection method uses an IDbased key exchange protocol that does not require any service center to distribute keys or devices to keep directories of keys. Our rigorous security analysis shows no weaknesses in the proposed method, and demonstrates no simple method of recovering the secret key. We also confirm the security of the proposed integrity protection method against ciphertext-only attacks and known/chosen plaintext attacks. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed method is the first secure technical solution that meets the strict communication latency requirements in protective relaying in transmission and distribution substations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the application and security requirements of smart grid. Section 3 summarizes the related work. Section 4 provides details of the proposed embedding and integrity verification algorithms. The security of the proposed method is evaluated using an adversarial model in Sections 5. Section 6 evaluates the performance of the proposed method with respect to computational complexity and running time, and the results are compared with previous works. Section 7 discusses the applications where the proposed integrity protection could be utilized to maintain strict time latency, high throughput, and low energy consumption. Finally, Section 8 concludes that the proposed scheme is secure, efficient and feasible.
Smart Grid Applications and their Requirements
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems in emerging smart grids monitor, control and protect power system components by making use of a network of PMUs. As shown in Figure 1 , synchronous PMUs are installed in various locations (key substations) of the transmission and distribution lines and capture voltage magnitude, phase, and line frequency 30 to 60 times a second. PMU measurements could be used for different smart grid applications, all of which have their own latency requirements depending upon the kind of system response they are dealing with. Based on latency requirements, there are two main classes of applications: Energy management applications with a latency of seconds and power system protection applications with a tight latency of milliseconds. In energy management applications, PMUs send their measurements along with their global position system (GPS) location to PDCs. This is done through a publish-subscribe mechanism, where the PMUs work as publishers to which the PDCs subscribe. A PDC receives data from many (typically 3 to 32) PMUs, and then sorts and aggregates the received data based on a time-tag. The aggregated data is then relayed using a twoway communication system to a number of local control centers (LCCs), which coordinate their actions interacting with a federated control center (FCC). Subsequently, LCCs draw the best overall snapshot solution using all PMU measurements (Weng et al., 2016) .
In protection applications, time is critical and therefore a fast message communication is required. Figure 2 shows examples of time critical applications, such as short circuit analysis (Bose, 2010) , relay protection (Neyestanaki and Ranjbar, 2015) , oscillation detection (Moslehi and Kumar, 2010) , frequency and voltage stability monitoring (Zhang et al., 2010) , load shed (Adamiak et al., 2014) and synchrophasorassisted transfer trip (Kundu and Pradhan, 2014) where a trip signal is sent from a substation to another that could be more than 100 miles away. Delay requirements for power system networks depend on a number of parameters, such as the specific protection equipment used. Most power line equipment can endure faults or short circuits for up to approximately five power cycles before experiencing irreversible damage or affecting other segments in the network. This translates to total fault clearance time of less than 84 ms. However, as a safety precaution, actual operation time of protection systems is limited to approximately 70 percent of this period, including fault recognition time, command transmission time and line breaker switching time (Wetterwald P. and Raymond J., 2015) . Some system components, such as large electromechanical switches, require particularly long time to operate and take up the majority of the total clearance time, leaving only a 10 ms window for the communications part of the protection scheme, independent of the distance to travel. Given the sensitivity of the issue, communication networks impose requirements that are even more stringent, for instance IEC 61850 standard limits the transfer time for protection messages to 1 4 cycle or 4 ms (for 60 Hz lines) for the most critical messages. Control centers use the IEC 61850-90-5 standard to communicate with smart measurement units (IEC 61850-90-5, 2012 ). This standard (as shown in Figure 3 ) utilizes a generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) protocol for fast relay-to-relay communications. Since GOOSE messages are time critical, they are only associated with three layers of the open systems interconnection (OSI) model, namely, physical, datalink, and application layers. IEC 61850 utilizes a standardized Ethernet frame with a maximum payload size of 1492 bytes (Fan et al., 2015) . The number of required measurements depends on the topology of the power grid as well as the requirements of optimal estimation of the system states (Martin, K., Zwergel, A., and Kapostasy, D., 2015) . Generally, in each substation, the principal bus voltages should be included in the measurement set. To this end, several PMUs are normally used to cover a large substation. The size of measurement data depends on the number of voltages that a PMU measures. Table 1 gives the size of payload data in transmission and distribution substations under various PMU/PDC configurations.
Although the use of PMUs has facilitated the efficient management and delivery of power in current smart grids, it is vulnerable to integrity attacks. The standard for formatting and delivery of PMU data (IEEE Standard C37.118 (Martin et al., 2008) ) includes no end-to-end security mechanisms, and transmits messages in plaintext without any mechanism to protect their integrity. Although, a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) (Sobolewski, 2003) is used in the PMU data frame, the integrity protection of a CRC is null, as it cannot detect intentional tampering. To this end, IEC 61850-90-5 mandates the use of a number of message authentication code (MAC) algorithms (Table 2) in combination with UDP/IP and/or IGMP/DSCP protocols (IEC 61850-90-5, 2012) , where the use of MAC algorithms is determined by an identifier in the message header based upon latency requirements.
The complete deployment of IEC 61850-90-5 will take a long time (Seyed Reza et al., 2016) because of the compatibility issues of the standard as well as the hardware issues. For example, there are still many PMUs and PDCs in operation that have no cryptographic acceleration (Pappu et al., 2013) . In addition, when the latency implied by the MAC implementation cannot be tolerated, IEC 61850-90-5 allows the transmission of messages in the absence of integrity protection, as shown in Table 2 . This mainly happens in protection applications where time is critical and therefore a fast message communication is required. In such applications, the use of MAC algorithm is largely disabled by setting the identifier to zero. This leaves the PMU data vulnerable to man-inthe-middle attacks, which can alter the current phasor of the bus, for instance, to a value greater than the maximum rated current of the line or even to zero amperes. This would trigger protective relays to switch on and off, which could be costly to electrical equipment and perturb the grid, potentially leading to blackouts.
Related work
Recent research has mainly been focused on preserving the integrity of PMU data in applications where latency is on the order of seconds (rather than milliseconds), such as static state estimation, power flow analysis and model validation. The integrity problem in such applications can be addressed using conventional hash based techniques, such as a cipher-based MAC (CMAC) (Dworkin, 2007) and a hash-based MAC (HMAC) (Khan et al., 2007) . However, these solutions cannot be used in power system protection because of the latency implied by the overheads. Despite the importance of data integrity in the protection of power equipment, only a few technological solutions have been given, (Guo et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2008; Abuadbba and Khalil, 2015; Abuadbba et al., 2016) , which mainly utilized steganographic methods. Compared to crypto primitives, steganographic methods normally require less memory, power and processing capabilities, which can suit the constrained capabilities AES-GMAC 128 of smart grid infrastructure.
In (Guo et al., 2007) , Guo et al. proposed a fragile watermarking method for protecting the integrity of payload data. In this scheme, payload is firstly split into groups of variable size. The size of the group is determined adaptively as a function of the data itself. A secure hash function, such as MD5, is then applied to each data element in the payload. If the hash value is zero, then the data element marks the end of the group. A watermark is formed by both the current group hash value and the group hash value of the next group. The watermark is stored in the least significant bits of all data elements. However, Guo et al.'s watermarking scheme needs to compute a secure hash function several times. Therefore, it is computationally expensive for the microprocessors used in PMUs.
In (Zhang et al., 2008) , Zhang et al. proposed an end-to-end, statistical approach for the integrity protection of sensory measurement data using a direct spread spectrum sequence (DSSS) based watermarking technique. In this scheme, the measurement data, which is sent from the sender nodes, is visualized as an image at different time snapshots, in which every sender node is viewed as a pixel and its value corresponds to the gray level of the pixel. Following this equivalency, a watermark is embedded in this image in a distributed fashion at each node. Given the watermark as a prior knowledge, the receiver is then able to verify the integrity of the measure-ment data. However, the proposed method is disclosed using known/chosen plaintext attacks, because the size of embedding data is much smaller than the size of payload data, and watermarks are generated under the same key.
In (Abuadbba and Khalil, 2015) , Abuadbba and Khalil proposed a steganographic method, which protects the integrity of smart grid readings by hiding a confidential information (a fingerprint) bit-by-bit inside the detailed subband coefficients of the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) of the payload data. Although this method is much faster than MAC-based solutions, it cannot protect the integrity of the complete payload data, because the adversary can simply spoof a fradualent message by modifying the approximation coefficients of DWT of the payload data. In other words, only one pair of covertext and stegotext is enough to break the integrity protection algorithm. In addition, the embedding process makes irreversible distortions at the location of hidden bits in the covertext. Therefore, a portion of measurement data will be lost, which may impact the decision making process of control centers. The transmitted stegotext is highly prone to intentional (interference) and unintentional (noise) attacks rendering the steganography based integrity protection solutions impractical. Indeed, any slight change in the transmitted stegotext will result in the loss of embedded information, and more significantly, loss of faith in the received GOOSE message. To this end, Abuadbba et al. (Abuadbba et al., 2016) combined a 3D DWT based steganographic method with an error detection and correction technique, namely, BCH syndrome codes, to detect and recover any change in the payload data. However, the size of hidden data is much less than the size of payload data, and therefore, similar to (Abuadbba and Khalil, 2015) , the location of the embedded data is easily disclosed by making use of known/chosen covertext attacks. 
It follows that steganography by itself cannot

Notation
Description N
The number of bytes in a plaintext P A plaintext represented by an 8N -bit array X A checksum represented by a 16-bit array E An expanded text represented by a (8N + 15)-bit array C A ciphertext represented by a (8N + 15)-bit array p(i)
A binary value at the position
A binary value at the position d (0 ≤ d ≤ 15) of the checksum e(w)
A binary value at the position w (0 ≤ w ≤ 8N + 15) of the expanded text c(j)
A binary value at the position j (0 ≤ j ≤ 8N + 15) of the ciphertext K
The set of secret keys P
The set of N bytes in a plaintext P , that is,
The set of byte locations for a plaintext P with N bytes, that is,
The probability that the resulting sequence of the t-th query and response is
The probability that a ciphertext C t+1 is transmitted by the sender as the next message, given the sequence of current query and response pairs (P t , C t ) sufficiently address the integrity problem, and it needs to be combined with another method, such as hashing or encryption, to make the stegotext secure from attacks. To this end, we propose a novel lightweight solution for the integrity problem, which is secure from well-known attacks.
Proposed Integrity Protection Scheme
The building blocks of the proposed scheme are explained in following subsections. The notations used in the explanation are listed in Table 3 .
16-bit Fletcher Checksum
The 16-bit Fletcher checksum has two variants: a one's complement and a two's complement version. In this paper, we used the former, because it provides better error detection than the latter (Nakassis, 1988) . The 16-bit Fletcher checksum is calculated iteratively over a sequence of 8 bit blocks, namely, P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P N −1 , by maintaining two unsigned one's-complement 16-bit accumulators R and S, whose contents are initially zero.
The pseudo-code of the 16-bit Fletcher checksum is given in Algorithm 1. It could be shown that at the end of the Fletcher's loop, R will contain the 8-bit one's complement sum of all 8 bit blocks in the payload data, and S will contain N · P 0 + (N − 1) · P 1 + · · · + P N −1 . One advantage of the Fletcher algorithm is that it detects the transposition of octets/words of any size within the data stream. The error detection properties of the Fletcher checksum is comparable to CRCs (Sobolewski, 2003) with significantly reduced computational cost.
Permutation-only Encryption
The permutation-only encryption scheme shuffles the bit locations within an expanded text E, which is constructed by appending the checksum X to the payload data P . The bit permutation process dissipates the statistical structure of the expanded text into long range statistics. To permute the bit locations, a sequence of pseudorandom numbers is constructed by a concatenation of three pseudo-random sequences generated from a linear congruential pseudo-random number generator, defined by the following recurrence relation:
, h mod 4 = 1, q mod 2 = 1, and y 0 is arbitrary.
If h and q are selected appropriately, for example, h ∈ {2891336453, 29943829, 32310901} and q ∈ {3, 5, 7}, the generated sequences pass formal statistical tests (Bellare et al., 1997) . To avoid repetition, differing seeds are used to initiate linear congruential generators. The pseudo-random sequence is then sorted in an ascending order, and Algorithm 1 16-bit Fletcher checksum 1: procedure Fletcher(P )
{Fletcher computes the checksum value X, given a payload P } 2:
8 denotes a logical left shift of S by 8 bits 8: end procedure Algorithm 2 Permutation-only encryption 1: procedure Permutation(E, K)
{Permutation rearranges the bit locations, given an expanded text E and a key K = (y 0 , y 0 , y 0 )} 2:
for
end for 12: end procedure therefore, a unique index order number is obtained. To complete the permutation, each bit of the expanded text E is relocated according to its corresponding index order. The permuted array forms the ciphertext C. More precisely,
The permutation-only encryption scheme is described in Algorithm 2.
Since we are using permutation as a basic mechanism in our algorithm, the plaintext cannot be all 0's or all 1's, since the permutation would not do anything in that case. In case of the PMU data, this cannot happen since the PMU includes items such as frequency and time stamp that can never be zero or negative if it is valid. Furthermore, no real SCADA system should accept an input without at least an elementary range and other sanity checks; therefore, even if arbitrary bit patterns are sent to it, it will simply discard them. Furthermore, if such patterns are sufficiently observed frequently, it would trigger an alarm, which would notify the control center of potential availability attacks. It is also possible Algorithm 3 Checksum embedding 1: procedure Embedding(P , K)
{Embedding embeds a Fletcher checksum and generates a ciphertext C, given a plaintext P and a key K} 2:
X ← Fletcher(P ) 3:
E ← [P , X] P and X are concatenated to form E 4:
C ← Permutation(E, K) 5: end procedure Algorithm 4 Integrity verification 1: procedure Verification(C, K)
{Verification checks the integrity of a transmitted payload, given a ciphertext C and a key K} 2:
. , e(8N + 15)] 5:
X ← Fletcher(P ) 6:
if X = X then 7:
Integrity verification is failed 8:
end if 9: end procedure for our integrity mechanism to append additional random bits on the transmit side that are removed on the receiver side.
Cryptographic Properties
The recurrence relations used in Algorithm 2 are fast, and require minimal memory (32 bits) to preserve the state. This allows the simulation of multiple independent streams. Moreover, there is no repetition in the permutation sequence, because the period of each linear congruential generator 2 32 is by design much larger than 8N +16. To further study the statistical properties, the NIST SP800-22 tests (L'Ecuyer and Simard, 2007) were applied to a sequences of 10 million bits generated using the linear congruential generators. The test results are reported in Table 4 using Pvalue, which summarizes the strength of the evidence against the randomness (null) hypothesis. For these tests, each P -value is the probability that a perfect random number generator would have produced a sequence less random than the sequence that was tested, given the kind of nonrandomness assessed by the test. A P -value less than 0.01 is an indication that the randomness hypothesis is false with a confidence level of 0.99. As shown in Table 4 , the sequence passed the test.
The pseudo-random numbers generated by linear congruential generators are known to be predictable in their simplest form (Plumstead, 1983) . Even if the parameters y 0 , h, q, and b are unknown (used as the secret key), the sequence of numbers produced by a linear congruential generator is still predictable given some of the y j for j (0 ≤ j ≤ 8N + 15) (Plumstead, 1983) . However, this predictability does not imply that a cryptographic algorithm using a linear congruential generator is breakable, because the random numbers used by the permutation algorithm are intermediate values, which are not made public.
Salting Procedure
To avoid using the same permutation mapping, the key is randomized with a salt value. Since GOOSE is a connectionless protocol, it would require out-of-band synchronization for employing key randomization. Such out-of-band synchronization is difficult to achieve in the constrained substation environment. Therefore, to avoid out-of-band synchronization, the key is salted with the status number (a 32-bit counter) in the GOOSE message to generate differing permutations in every log 2 (8N + 16) − 1 PMU transmissions, where N is the number of plaintext bytes. This helps to resist certain types of cryptanalysis, such as plaintext attacks and precomputed rainbow table attacks (Oechslin, 2003) . If the limit of the status number (that is, 2 32 ) is reached, the GOOSE protocol re-establishes the number (namely roll-over), and the secret key is re-synced. For example, for N = 128 bytes, the key is salted every 10 transmissions using a counter, which is 32 bits in most microprocessors. Assuming PMU sampling rate of 60 per seconds, re-keying is needed only every 2 32 6 seconds or 22 years, which is much longer than re-syncing peri-ods chosen for other reasons.
Embedding and Verification Procedures
The Embedding and Verification algorithms are defined over three sets, namely the plaintext P , the ciphertext C, and the key K, respectively. P is not an arbitrary set, and it follows IEEE C37.118 (Martin et al., 2008) . Each key determines a mapping from a set of plaintext into a set of ciphertext, and vice versa. The embedding procedure computes the checksum X of the plaintext P ; it appends the checksum to the payload data P , and then, permutes the expanded data using a fast keyed bit shuffler. More precisely, C = Π k [P , X], where X = Fletcher(P ), and [P , X] denotes the concatenation of P and X. The embedding process is described in Algorithm 3.
The content verification procedure is the inverse procedure of checksum embedding. To verify the integrity of transmitted messages, the receiver first decrypts the received message C using a shared key K; recomputes the checksum value X , and then, compares it with the embedded checksum X. If the computed and received checksum mismatch, then this shows that there was a message modification. This procedure is detailed in Algorithm 4.
Key Exchange
IEC 61850-6 recognizes the burden of implementing cryptography on PMUs/PDCs with relatively low processing power and allows the transmission of GOOSE protection messages, which require a strict 4 ms response time, without integrity protection. Our proposed solution covers this missing integrity gap. However, since the proposed integrity protection method uses a symmetric encryption algorithm, its security highly depends on the initial key agreement, rekeying, and revocation. To address this concern, we propose a secure and efficient key management between PMUs and PDCs in transmission and distribution substations. In the PMU/PDC communication model, the participants, namely, group members are PDCs and PMUs, through which a PDC receives data streams from multiple PMUs and correlates them in real-time into a single data stream that is transmitted to a computer via an Ethernet port. A PDC can use multicast to communicate with all of the PMUs in its range. PMUs regis-ter with the PDC to form a group. During the registration, the group key is exchanged through a centralized model (PDC as the cluster head). The PDC can also re-initiate the contact (rekey process) with group PMUs.
Previous group key schemes (Felde et al., 2017) cannot be deployed directly since 1) they require a service center to store key directories, 2) they are not able to minimize the downtime during smart grid's operation, and 3) Most PMU/PDCs are equipped with limited memory and low-capacity micro-controllers, which tend to be restricted in their storage capability and computation.
An efficient solution is to share a symmetric group key between all multicast participants. With the support of the shared key (group key), the integrity of multicast communication data can be maintained and verified. The group key is updated (that is, rekeyed) using a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, when all keys are exhausted or when a member joins/leaves the group. Although Diffie-Hellman key exchange between PMUs and PDC is expensive in terms of communication overheads and computational costs, it is feasible, because in PMU/PDC communication, PMU and PDC devices have stationary membership. The group membership change events, for example, joining/leaving are rare, unless a device becomes faulty and/or a new PMU/PDC device is installed in the substation. In addition, given that the minimum size of payload data is 40 bytes in a single channel PMU measurement (Table 1) , the key should be salted every 8 transmissions using a counter, which is 32 bits in most microprocessors. Assuming PMU sampling rate of 60 per seconds, re-keying is needed only every 2 32 7.5 seconds or 18 years, which is much longer than re-syncing periods chosen for other reasons.
We propose an ID-based key exchange protocol that uses a Diffie-Hellman public key distribution scheme and the device identification information (ID) instead of the public key used in the Diffie-Hellman scheme. The advantage of our scheme is that it does not require any services of a center to distribute keys or devices to keep directories of keys.
Algorithm Setup
Step 1: When the network is set up, a trusted key generation center in substation generates two prime numbers p and q, each about 256 bits long, and determines a prime number e and an integer d, satisfying e · d (mod(p − 1) · (q − 1)) = 1, with both e and d less than n = p · q. It also determines an integer g, which is a primitive element in GF (p) and GF (q). The trusted key generation center generates and publishes (n, g, e) but keeps (p, q, d) secret.
Step 2: For an authorized device A, the trusted key generation center assigns it a randomly generated ID, named ID a , and computes s a = ID −d a mod n. Then, the trusted key generation center stores (n, g, e, ID a , s a ) into a smart card and issues it to A.
Step 3: For an authorized device B, the trusted key generation center assigns it a randomly generated ID, named ID b , and computes s b = ID −d b mod n. Then, the trusted key generation center stores (n, g, e, ID b , s b ) into a smart card and issues it to B.
Step 4: A and B respectively input/insert these secret value to their devices via secure channel, for example, through physically touch methods via smart cards.
Step 5: A randomly generates an integer r a and computes t a = g ra+ID b · s a . B randomly generates an integer r b and computes t b = g r b +IDa · s b .
Step 6: A and B exchange (ID a , t a ) and (ID b , t b ).
Step 7: A and B compute the followings to retrieve the key.
Security Analysis
Mathematically, the adversary could be considered as an oracle machine which has access to the sender's embedding function without knowing the key. The adversary asks n number of queries from the sender's embedding function to obtain a set of n plaintext and ciphertext pairs, that is, ∆ = {(P t , C t ) | t = 1, 2, . . . , n}. If the adversary successfully breaks the integrity protection algorithm, the location of the checksum is disclosed, and therefore, the adversary can create a forgery that cannot be detected by the verification algorithm of the receiver. The spoofing query is successful if the adversary receives a positive verification response (C t+1 , 1) from the receiver. This type of spoofing represents a rather strong adversary, but is realistic in smart grid settings, since the messages could be intercepted and potentially forged. The above discussion suggests that defining security against such a strong adversary is usually not a simple task. Before we analyze the security of our proposed method, we point out why simpler variants of the same idea are insecure. Suppose that we encrypt the payload data using pseudo-random permutations, that is, C = Π k (P ). Permutation dissipates the statistical structure of the payload into long range statistics. Choosing a permutation of large length size can exponentially increase the number of possible permutations of payload, that is, #(π) = (8N )!. This exponential search space can make the statistical attacks cumbersome by increasing the size of a payload data. However, the encryption of payload bits can only maintain data confidentiality, rather than integrity. As explained in (Krawczyk, 2001) , an adversary can simply spoof a new message by modifying the bits in transit.
Another variant is to hide a checksum inside the payload data. This could be achieved by using a steganographic method, for instance, an LSB method (Cogranne and Retraint, 2013) . However, this method is not secure from chosencovertext attacks and chosen-stegotext attacks (Cohen and Lapidoth, 2002) . Only one pair of chosen covertext and stegotext is enough to disclose the location of hidden checksum, which is sufficient to bypass the integrity protection algorithm. This problem could be solved by encrypting or hashing the embedded payload (that is, expanded text). However, this solution is not appropriate because of the high latency induced by cryptographic primitives. Now we analyze the security of the proposed integrity protection method, that is, C = Π k [P , X].
Ciphertext-Only Attack
Theorem 1. The proposed integrity protection scheme is secure from ciphertext-only attacks.
Proof. In a ciphertext-only attack, the adversary is able to observe the transmitted ciphertext (that is, the embedded GOOSE message), and then, recalculate the checksum value of the first N bytes in every possible permutation, that is, (8N + 16)! checksum recalculations (in worst case). If the value of the recalculated checksum corresponds to the last two bytes of a permutation, then the checksum bytes and their locations will be disclosed. However, this is infeasible for a large N . As discussed in Section 1, the minimum size of a PMU data is 40 bytes, which means the adversary needs to recalculate at least 2.11 × 10 664 checksums. This number of computations is extremely large, and thus makes the ciphertext-only attack impractical. A less computationally intensive approach is to simply try to guess the key. However, brute-force attacks are not feasible, because the proposed algorithm employs three 32-bit secret seeds (recall Algorithm 2), which makes the key size more than 80 bits, that is, the minimum key space recommended by NIST (Barker et al., 2016) . This requires checking 10 28 possibilities, which too is infeasible.
Known-Plaintext Attack
In the following, we derive an information theoretic bound on the success probability of the query adversary, who spoofs after making t oracle queries, under the assumption that the key is not changed during the queries. To this end, we use the following lemmas for the proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 1. Let (P t , C t ) be a pair of query and response with P r(P t , C t ) = 0, let C t+1 denote a ciphertext with P r(C t+1 | (P t , C t )) = 0, and let K = K((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1)). Then, P r(C t+1 |(P t , C t )) · log 2 (P r(C t+1 |(P t , C t ))) ≤ k∈K P r(k,C t+1 | (P t ,C t )) · log 2 (P r((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1))) ·P r(C t+1 |k, (P t , C t )).
Proof. Let γ denote a function of k. If k ∈ K, then,γ = 1; otherwise, γ = 0. From P r(C t+1 | (P t , C t )) = 0, it follows that K = ∅ and P r((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1)) = 0. Accordingly, we can define a probability distribution Ψ ((Pt,Ct),C t+1 ) on k as 1) ) .
(4) Since P r((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1)) = k∈K P r(k | (P t , C t )) · γ(k), then, k∈K Ψ ((Pt,Ct),C t+1 ) (k) = 1. Therefore, Ψ ((Pt,Ct),C t+1 ) is a probability distribution. If P r(C t+1 | k, (P t , C t )) = 0, then, γ(k, C t+1 , (P t , C t )) = 1; thus, we can rewrite the conditional entropy as P r(C t+1 | (P t , C t )) = k∈K P r(k|(P t , C t ))·P r(C t+1 |k, (P t , C t ))·γ(k).
(5) By the definition of Ψ ((Pt,Ct),C t+1 ) , we get P r(C t+1 |(P t , C t )) = k∈K Ψ ((Pt,Ct),C t+1 ) (k)· P r((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1)) · P r(C t+1 | k, (P t , C t )).
Using Jensen's Inequality (Briat, 2011) and Equation 4, we obtain
This proves the lemma.
Proof. From the definition of H(C t+1 | (P t , C t )) and the use of Lemma 1, Ct) ,(C t+1 ,1)) P r(k | (P t , C t ))· P r(C t+1 | k, (P t , C t ))·log 2 (P r(C t+1 | k, (P t , C t ))).
This relation is expanded by the definition of H(C t+1 |K,(Pt,Ct)) as
Since P r(P t , C t ) ≥ P r((P t , C t ), (C t+1 , 1)), we have
This completes the proof.
We are now in position to prove the following lower bound on the success probability of the query adversary.
Theorem 2. Given the proposed integrity protection scheme, let P r t denote the probability of success of an adversary, who spoofs after making t oracle queries. Then, P r t ≥ |K| −1 t+1 .
Proof. This proof is a direct application of the proof used in (Rosenbaum, 1993) to the situation in which the adversary makes oracle queries rather than observing messages. From the definition of the conditional mutual information,
. By the definition of P r t and using Jensen's Inequality (Briat, 2011) , we obtain log 2 (P r t ) = log 2 (
The lower bound of log 2 (P r t (P t , C t )) proved in Lemma 2 yields C t+1 ∈∆ P r(P t , C t ) · log 2 (P r t (P t , C t )) ≥ C t+1 ∈∆ P r( Pt,Ct )·(H(C t+1 |K, (Pt, Ct)) − H( C t+1 |( Pt, Ct)))= H(C t+1 | K, (P t , C t )) − H(C t+1 | (P t , C t )).
Using Inequalities 11 and 12, we obtain P r t ≥ 2 H(K|C t+1 ,(Pt,Ct))−H(K|(Pt,Ct)) . (13) Accordingly, − log 2 (P r t+1 )≤− log 2 (P r 0 × P r 1 × · · · × P r t ) ≤ (H(K) − H(K|(P 1 , C 1 ))) + (H(K | (P 1 , C 1 )) − H(K|(P 2 , C 2 ))) + · · · + (H(K|(P t , C t )) −H(K|(P t+1 , C t+1 ))) = H(K) −H(K|(P t+1 , C t+1 )) ≤ H(K). Therefore, log 2 (P r t ) ≥ − 1 t+1 H(K). Since keys are equally likely to be used, and also as the probability of success after the observation of t pairs of plaintext and ciphertext is equal, we have H(K) = log 2 (|K|). Therefore, log 2 (P r t ) ≥ − 1 t+1 log 2 (|K|). This proves the theorem.
In the following, we explain a strategy that a query adversary may undertake for known plaintext attacks.
Lemma 3. Given a permutation-only encryption primitive, which operates on plaintexts with 8N + 16 number of binary entries, the number of required known plaintexts n to perform a successful known-plaintext attack is O( log 2 (8N + 16) ).
Proof. In a known-plaintext attack, to disclose the permutation mapping, which works on arrays of 8N + 16 bits, it is sufficient to input a plaintext with distinct entries. However, from the practical point of view, constructing a plaintext with distinct entries may not be feasible, because each entry of the plaintext array is from a finite set {0, 1}, and the number of entry locations, that is 8N +16, exceeds the number of entry values. Therefore, a collection of plaintexts, all of which have repeated entry values, is required to uniquely determine the underlying permutation. This problem is equivalent to splitting an array with distinct entries into a number of arrays whose entry values are equal or less than the maximum number of entry values. To split the array, the adversary needs to expand the entries using n digit expansions in radix 2, where n digits clearly produce 2 n different values. This implies the following relationship for the number 8N + 16 of entry locations:
The inequalities above indicate that the source entries can be expanded by O( log 2 (8N + 16) ) digits, and therefore, the source array can split into O( log 2 (8N + 16) ) plaintexts. In other words, O( log 2 (8N + 16) ) plaintexts construct a source array with distinct entries.
Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In a chosen-plaintext attack, which is a stronger notion of security compared to a known-plaintext attack, the aim is to find a procedure with a reduced number of required plaintexts.
Lemma 4. Given a permutation-only encryption primitive, which operates on plaintexts with 8N + 16 number of binary entries, the number of required chosen plaintexts n to perform a successful chosen-plaintext attack is n = log 2 (8N +16) .
Proof. Theoretically, the permutation mapping can be easily deduced using a source array of size 8N + 16, whose entries are sequentially labeled with distinct values 0, 1, . . . , 8N +15. However, this is not practical, because the encryption/decryption primitives only operate on binary values, which are less than the number of entries.
Therefore, to make the attack feasible, the entries are firstly expanded by log 2 (8N + 16) digits with radix 2. This matrix is then separated into log 2 (8N + 16) numbers of plaintexts based on the digit positions in radix 2. Once permutation is applied to the plaintexts, it produces log 2 (8N + 16) ciphertexts with entries in radix 2. A combination of ciphertexts using the positional digits reveals the mapped locations.
We are now in position to prove the following theorem. Theorem 3. The proposed integrity verification scheme is secure from known/chosen plaintext attacks.
Proof. To falsify the data, the adversary needs to disclose the permutation mapping. To this end, following Lemmas 3 and 4, the adversary asks at least log 2 (8N + 16) queries from the oracle machine to determine the permutation mapping. These queries are made under the assumption that the same key is used for generating plaintext and ciphertext pairs in each and every queries. However, the keys are salted to a frequency less than the required number of pairs for a successful attack, and are all equally likely to be used. Nevertheless, the adversary tries to impersonate the sender by using only one query. Following Theorem 2, the minimum probability of success for such attacks is 1 √ |K| , which is negligible. In addition, the adversary may try to find the permutation period, or may try to exhaust all possible permutation keys by asking numerous queries. Such an analysis could provide the adversary with a number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs, which had been generated using the same key. However, the permutation domain grows exponentially by increasing the size of payload, and this makes the attack computationally infeasible. For instance, given a payload data with 100 bytes, 9.33 × 10 157 queries need to be asked to exhaust all keys. This is computationally infeasible, and makes the proposed scheme secure from known/chosen plaintext attacks.
Salt Attack
In a salt attack scenario, the adversary attempts to partially disclose the key by comparing different pairs of plaintext and ciphertext, which were made under small modifications of salt value.
Since the status number has linear properties, the proposed scheme seems to be vulnerable to offpath attacks (Gilad, Y. and Herzberg, A., 2014) .
The adversary can observe the initial messages, and hence, determine the status number. The adversary can then perform a man-in-the-middle attack, and fabricate a new status number for the GOOSE message. To this end, the adversary may increase the status number, because a message with a lower status number than that of the previously received message will not be processed. However, the receiver can easily recognize the fake GOOSE messages through the verification process. Any change in the status number would result in a different permutation mapping, which makes the message verification fail at the receiver side. In addition, knowing the salt value does not help in finding the secret key, because permutation indices are constructed by the numerical order of expanded key stream; and thus, it is not easy to obtain the exact expanded key from permutation indices. Furthermore, the permutation domain is long, and this makes the adversarial analysis difficult to find pairs which were encrypted under the same key. Another attack strategy is to take control over the status number, before the embedding process, on the receiver's side. To this end, the adversary may give the same status (order) to GOOSE messages. This may provide the adversary with a number of plaintext and ciphertext pairs that are generated under the same encryption key. Under such attack scenarios, the security margin of the proposed scheme would be log 2 (8N +16) chosen queries (as demonstrated in Figure 4 ). However, such physical attacks may be impractical, because the access points of PMUs are physically secured upon proper configuration, which prevents tampering and reprogramming. Nonetheless, the adversary makes further effort to break the scheme by making use of less number of chosen queries (even one). Following Theorem 2, since the permutation domain depends on the size of the plaintext, the minimum success probability of an adversary, who uses only one query for an attack, is
, which is negligible. Figure 5 depicts the log scale curve of the minimum success probability of an adversary, who uses at most log 2 (8N+16) −1 queries. As shown in Figure 5 , this probability is negligible.
Key Exchange Attack
It is very difficult to prove the security of the proposed key exchange method in a strict sense, but we can demonstrate that it is probably secure. Firstly, the adversary cannot easily ac- cess PMU/PDC smart cards, because the access points of PMUs are physically secured upon proper configuration, which prevents tampering and reprogramming. However, the adversary is able to obtain public values (n, g, e). The adversary attempts to disguise as a legitimate PMU to exchange keys with PDC. Since it is impossible for the adversary to obtain (ID P DC , t P DC ), he/she randomly generates a two-tuple (x, y) in place of (ID P DC , t P DC ) and calculates a key with the equation k = ((g −ID · y) e · x) r mod n, which is not same as the key generated by PDC, and hence the adversary cannot fool PDC to accept a manipulated PMU measurement.
Experimental Performance Evaluation
In addition to security analysis, the performance of the integrity protection algorithm is also an important factor to consider, especially for realtime GOOSE communications, which require a high level of efficiency. The computational complexity of the integrity protection algorithm is the summation of complexities of the 16-bit Fletcher checksum generation and the bit permutation process. Given an array of length n, the complexity of computing the 16-bit Fletcher checksum is α · n, where α is a constant. The computational complexity of the bit permutation process is the sum of complexities of the pseudo-random number generation and the radix sorting procedure. The computational complexity of generating n pseudo-random numbers using a linear congruential generator is β · n, where β is a constant. In addition, given an array of length n, radix sorting rearranges the array in linear time. Therefore, in the worst case, a permutation of an array with length n is achieved using µ·n computations, where µ is a constant. Accordingly, the computational complexity of the integrity protection algorithm is (α + β + µ) · n.
Given that the maximum size of payload data is 1492 bytes, a feasible integrity protection method should have a minimum throughput of higher than 373 kilobytes per second (KB/s). This allows parties to communicate reliably within the maximum acceptable latency (4 ms). Since the most recent microprocessors in substation automation systems use ARM Cortex-M processor cores, we evaluated the throughput of the integrity protection algorithm on an ARM Cortex-M0 platform with 48 MHz frequency.
For this experimental evaluation, we use K = (1, 2, 3) as a representative key for the performance analysis. We also compared our performance results with that of MD5, Chaskey, ChaCha20-Poly1305, AES-128-CCM, AES-128-EAX, and AES-128-GCM on the same platform (Birr-Pixton, 2015; Mouha et al., 2014) . The benchmark results on an ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor are shown in Table 5 . Benchmarks show that all methods have the same computational complexity O(n), where n is the number of message bytes. O(n) gives an asymptotic bound c · n, which describes a linear growth for a significantly large n. However, since n is bounded, the constant factor c makes a difference in running time. Compared to previous schemes, as confirmed by the run-time analysis shown in Table 5 , the proposed integrity protection method is much faster, and it is the only scheme that meets the minimum speed requirement, that is, 373 KB/s. This fast integrity checking opens the use of energy anomaly detection methods when multiple message exchange is required.
Applicability to Other Environments
The generality of our proposed integrity protection implies that it can also be utilized in applications that require strict time latency, high throughput, or low energy consumption. Some examples of these situations include the GOOSE protocol where the prime requirement is latency, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) where encryption throughput is of highest importance, and body sensor networks (BSNs) where energy consumption is a major concern.
For example, in ETSI Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) security standard (Festag, 2014) , the most stringent latency requirement for messages conveying imminent safety danger is 20 ms (Bertini, 2015) . With a typical 200B message size, this amounts to security processing rate of 20 KB/sec on both transmit and receive sides. Furthermore, given a typical safety message rate of 10/sec/vehicle, and a communication range of 300 meters, a vehicle may need to verify about 1000 messages/sec (Ahmed-Zaid et al., 2006) . In the worst case, several of these messages may arrive at the receiving vehicle almost simultaneously, and an even faster processing would be required to meet the 20 ms delay limit. Verifying the message integrity at such high rates would require specialized processors and hinder V2V deployment.
In general, the utilization of the proposed method is subject to following restrictions:
• Encryption keys need to be randomized with a salt value to a frequency less than log 2 (8N + 16) . In PMU data frame, the minimum size of payload data is 40 bytes, and therefore, key should be salted after every 8 communications. Frequent salting could be problematic in applications where the payload is very small; therefore, the algorithm may not be useful for environments using very small messages unless those messages are artificially padded.
• All 1's and all 0's bit patterns are not legit-imate for data payload; otherwise, the algorithm cannot be used. Therefore, as suggested in Subsection 4.2, the mechanism can always add some random bits on the transmit side and remove them on the receive side.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight and secure integrity protection algorithm for maintaining the integrity of PMU data in protective relaying applications. To be more precise, our proposed algorithm is used in the absence of integrity protection in IEC 61850-90-5, when the HMAC identifier is set to zero. The proposed method computes a 16-bit Fletcher checksum of the payload data, embeds it into the payload data, and then, shuffles the payload bits using a fast permutation-only encryption scheme. Since the proposed integrity protection method uses a symmetric encryption algorithm, its security highly depends on the initial key agreement. To this end, the scheme uses an ID-based key exchange protocol that does not require any service center to distribute keys or devices to keep directories of keys. We analyzed the security of our method with respect to a query adversary. Our analysis showed no weaknesses in the proposed method, and demonstrated no simple method of recovering the secret key. It also confirmed the security of the proposed integrity protection method against ciphertext-only attacks and known/chosen plaintext attacks. A comparison with a number of existing integrity protection methods showed that despite having the same level of computational complexity, the proposed method is much faster, and it is the only integrity protection scheme that meets the speed requirement. Since our algorithm is not intimately tied to smart grid communications protocols, it can be used in many other environments where low latency, high throughput, or low energy consumption is important.
